After the Storm

January 8, 2003
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN


CAIRO - Here's a prediction: In the end, 9/11 will have a
much bigger impact on the Arab and Muslim worlds than it
does on America. Lord knows, 9/11 has been a trauma for us,
and our response has been to strike back and install better
security. But 9/11 has been a trauma for Arabs and Muslims
as well - a shock to their systems that ranks with
Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, the creation of Israel and
the 1967 defeat.

For Arabs and Muslims, the shock has been that this act was
perpetrated by 19 of their sons in the name of their faith.
As a result their religious texts, political systems,
schoolbooks, chronic unemployment, media and even their
right to visit America have all been spotlighted and
questioned - sometimes fairly and sometimes unfairly.

While the shock of 1967 was profound, it ultimately led to
very little change in the Arab political or social order.
Because the post-'67 shock was blunted by two factors: the
existence of the Soviet Union, and Soviet aid, to cushion
regimes from the need to reform; and the dramatic rise in
oil wealth post-'67, which also bought off a lot of
pressures for change.

Today there is no Soviet Union, and because of the huge
population explosion in the Arab-Muslim world, there also
is not enough oil wealth to buy off pressures anymore. At
the same time, thanks to globalization, young Arabs and
Muslims have a much better sense of where they stand
vis-à-vis the world, and how far behind they are in many
cases. Finally, because America was the target of 9/11, a
refusal to face up to the local factors that produced the
9/11 hijackers runs the risk of a clash with the U.S.

Since 9/11 the Arab-Muslim world has passed through three
basic stages: shock, denial and, finally, introspection. It
is quite apparent here in Egypt, where, at least in part
because of 9/11, issues that people did not feel empowered
to discuss publicly are being tentatively aired.

``There was a strong collision on Sept. 11 between East and
West, between a car and a wall, and you can see the impact
on both today,'' remarked the Egyptian playwright Ali
Salem. ``You have become more suspicious, and we will
become more progressive. ... Look at Iraq. People do not
want to see any Iraqis killed. But few people will speak up
for Saddam Hussein now. People are against Saddam, because
they know there is no future for tyranny anymore.''

Two weeks ago Egypt's most influential newspaper, Al-Ahram,
ran a thoughtful series by President Hosni Mubarak's most
important political adviser, Osama el-Baz, cautioning
Egyptians against buying into European anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories and Holocaust denial. His articles were
triggered by intense criticism of Egypt for broadcasting,
on its state-run TV, a docudrama, ``Horseman Without a
Horse,'' that drew on the fraudulent anti-Semitic tract
``The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.''

``We must uphold the correct perspective on our
relationship with the Jews, as embodied in the legacy of
Arab civilization and in our holy scriptures,'' wrote Mr.
Baz. ``This legacy holds that ours is not a tradition of
racism and intolerance, that the Jews are our cousins
through common descent from Abraham and that our only
enemies are those who attack us. ... It is also important,
in this regard, that we refrain from succumbing to such
myths as `The Protocols of the Elders of Zion' and the use
of Christian blood in Jewish rituals.''

In part as a reaction to the religious intolerance
unleashed by 9/11, President Mubarak surprised his country
last month by announcing that henceforth Jan. 7 would be a
national holiday. Jan. 7 is the Coptic (Egyptian Christian)
Christmas, and it has now been elevated to equal status
with the Prophet Muhammad's birthday. For the first time
the president's son, Gamal, attended midnight mass, a visit
carried live on Egyptian TV.

After the prominent Egyptian journalist Mohammed Heikal
raised the question, in a recent TV interview, of who will
succeed President Mubarak, everyone has started talking in
public about it, and several Egyptians expressed to me
their hope that whenever the transition happens it will be
the start of a more formal democratization process.

Will it? Will introspection around the region actually lead
to a Stage 4 - fundamental political and economic reform? I
suspect that the leaders understand that this is a storm
they can't ride out. But they don't know how to change
without losing the control they've enjoyed. This tension
will be the drama of Arab-Muslim politics for the next
decade.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/08/opinion/08FRIE.html?ex=1043084262&ei=1&en=08e19b73f910eecc